Deconstructing States' Autonomy in Argumentation for External Intervention

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Abstract
Autonomy, the right of self-government (à la sovereignty), had been inalienable to states since modernism. It is so-crafted and consolidated as strategy for stymieing interstate internecine frictions triggered often by the unbridled/aggressive interlopings characterising the medieval princes and principalities, which consequently plagued and unsettled inter-principality relations. Thus, later with modernism, granting autonomous statehood to self-determinist/nationalist groups gained international acceptance/momentum after Serbian nationalist, Gavrilo Princip, assassinated the imperial Archduke Franz Ferdinand and wife. Ever since, especially after 1945 modern internationalism had significantly tamed interstate aggression through collectivised relations and constructive interconnectedness, fostering greater systemic control, peace, security and cooperation, which, in turn, enabled humanity to achieve mammoth growth and multifaceted development. Consequent upon the problem of growth by the end of that century, the world again began to experience new menaces, which endangered humanity in unprecedented proportions/dimensions. Many states failed or had violently been contested and became international liabilities, and quite a number of them had harboured migratory rogues that commit crimes against humanity. Also, multifaceted/syndicated terrorism and criminality had preyed on the sacrosanctness of states' autonomy and systemic interconnectedness to perpetrate humanitarian horrors. Consequently, two new conceptual strategies crept into the lexicon of internationality – state-building and intervention, toward rejigging systemic security by redeeming distressed states from becoming 'international public bads.' They, though, helped to recoup and manage systemic stability, nevertheless in operationalism, had scathing implications for states' autonomy. This work dissected, justified and essentialised intervention and state-building while arguing that states' autonomy needs deconstruction to sustain internationalism and humanity.

Keywords: autonomy, interventionism, state-building, international relations, global security

Introduction

The efforts from the external environment, either for intervention or state-building in autonomous state' systems have recently become very crucial and needful to save internationalism and humanity from horrendous declines. However, the endeavours, and their modus operandi had also become issues of great controversy, which stakeholders in the international society are grappling with. But their rising profiles and importance were becoming remarkable especially against the stark reality of the danger that state-failing or state-weakening may constitute to international peace and security, not to mention implosive conflicts that plunged states into horrors of genocide and regionally instability. The controversy with intervention and state-building stemmed from the fact that the original international rules, laws, conventions and regimes, and the conception of diplomacy guiding states' autonomy and interstate relations are contra, somewhat, to their practices.[1] They both constitute, to varying degrees, from subtle to rude, interference activities in the internal affairs of autonomous states.[2] Put differently, by international norms and law, states are deemed autonomous and

sovereign, which in political theory meant that, while every external interference is forbidden, the state government is the only legitimate authority in decision-making for state, and the ultimate agent equally saddled with maintenance of state's law/order. Hence, the United Nations' Charter, and indeed many other regional integration Charters, like the defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU), expressly forbade any appearance of interference in the internal affairs of member states.

States get destabilised by one, or a combination of factors, some of which may include natural ills, such as environmental disasters, famine, or man-made evil such as elite corruption, poor governance, demagogical or brute/tyrannical rule, civil war, armed invasion or external aggression, revolutions, terrorism and insurgency. But then, while states may helplessly confront or contend with natural disasters that obviously are beyond human jurisdiction, the man-made evils, which though were avoidable, are often extremely grave and difficult to bring to a stop, leading often to horrendous humanitarian crises. Such man-made evils led to the Second World War through the excessive tyrannical rules and aggression of the fascist regimes of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini in Europe, or the very repressive rule of Nicolae Ceausescu that turned Romania into a precarious police state. Other examples abound, especially in Africa, which happened to be the continent with the worst failed states in world's recent history. Without doubt, history will recall with infamy the inglorious rules of President Idi Amin Dada (1971–79), otherwise referred 'the butcher of Uganda' whose tyranny turned his country into a killing field and a failed economy, the self-styled Emperor Jean Bedel Bokassa (1976–79), whose horrible reign plunged the Central Africa Republic into complete chaos and poverty till date. President Mobutu Sese Seko of Congo–Zaire (1965–97), looted and helped foreigners to forage his country to comatose and rebellion till date, and as well, Siad Barre (1969–91) presided over Somalia until it imploded in ruins and shared out among various warlords. Today, Somalia is the epitome of state' failure.

Another major problem of growth that confronted the comity of states, ever since autonomy, had been the various advancements in science and technology. For instance, nuclear physics, which gave birth to atomic weapon, had also berthed positive developments in nuclear medicine, useful for the treatment of previously fatal ailments like cancers, and nuclear electric power plants in ways that would not aggravate global warming and climate-change problems, which otherwise had been in coal-driven thermal power plants. Similarly, chemical engineering had also yielded better medicines, including the development of urea, needed for higher agricultural productions. The list of the advancements are endless. But, despite that these had led to beneficial advancements especially in food production, better health provisions and good yields, the growths had become menacing by their other improvisations for harmful intentions, especially by such elements that are given to the utility of terror tactics for their own ends, and who actually were willing to acquire such destructive chemistries/technologies at all cost. For instance again, while nuclear weapon advancement had heightened arms racing and the fear of nuclear Armageddon, yet, many nations had sought to develop same, especially for such purposes of enhanced security and deterrence. But some loathsome entities wanted same, possibly for international vendetta and harassment, a development that had engendered such negative tagging as 'rogue states' or 'axis of evil'. The scenarios has already endangered the future of humanity, thereby calling to question the sanctity of the autonomy of states.

The very possibility of grave global dangers explains the essence of systemic regimes and international conventions toward avoiding systemic volatility and endangerment that may disturb international peace and security. Notable of such regimes is that of 'collective security' principle, and a number of other international protocols, established to keep nations in check.[3] In other

words, the possibility of grave international dangers had made national and world leaders, and other international stakeholders to strenuously strive for measures like the principle of 'collective security' that would engender international peace and security and systemic stability. Towards 'collective security' are the establishments of international monitor agencies, like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), empowered to pry into the activities of states, especially the so-called rogue states, and other vendetta-prone states, in the event they are reaching for unconventional and dangerous weapons of mass destruction. Similarly, the rising interconnectedness of our world, just also as the inevitable deepening of the interdependence of the globalised states, had also brought forth new vulnerabilities concerning systemic global and human safety. These have made the world's statesmen, other stakeholders and managers of the interstate system to be anxious about the well-being, the viability and stability of states. The logic of this is that once a state or a couple of them are destabilised, they stand to jeopardise other international endeavours for collective security, vis-a-vis, international peace and security.

The world had been rudely jolted by the satanic horrors of the World Wars and the Holocaust such that, when horrific crises occur in states (regardless of its geographic location),[4] morality and altruism, and the concern for the ripple-effect behoves it that the international society folds not its hands any longer. The horrors of the massacres witnessed in Rwanda against the minority Tutsi in 1993, and two years later in Srebrenica (Bosnia Herzegovina in 1995, commonly held as Europe's only known genocide since World War II) against Bosnian Muslims, had bled humanity and depressed our hearts with memories of scars. Similarly, the previous Taliban's repressive Rule in Afghanistan, which cooperated in the 1990s with Al-Qaeda, an organisation that utilised terrorism tactics to pursue its socio-political and religious-cultural goals, led in the new millennium to the unprecedented but acutely ghastly aero-terrors of September 11, 2001 attacks on the United states, killing close to three thousand peoples from multiple countries of the world. That was quickly followed by the Sudanese state' sponsorship of the Janjaweed Arab militia group that massacred hundreds of thousands of the indigenous Negro population in the Darfur region in western Sudan, for their lands and resources between 2003 and 2007. These, and many such other horrors had made the international society to increasingly jettison the autonomy of states, vis-a-vis the principle of non-interference in states, and rather opting for external intervention and state-building as important practices in the interest of international relations, peace and security.

Today, whereas state-building is associated with international efforts to help fragile states to stabilise and strengthen up, so as not to fail and constitute international public bad that could harbour wanton elements and criminality that may seek to destabilise other states, intervention, the forceful incursion into states is important to arrest such from chaotic drift and disorder. Indeed, as the world currently struggles to deal with the rising crises of alcoholism, drug smuggling and addiction, suicides, human trafficking, organ harvesting, terrorism and nuclear threats, and, most recently the climate change problems, all which have transnational consequences, the case for reappraising autonomy in favour of external interventions is apt.

However, it is also needful to affirm that both concepts had been contested in many quarters as violations of the principle that defines the sovereign independence of modern states. The purpose of this essay is to espouse the both concepts of intervention and state-building as international policies and remedial recipes, while identifying the relations between them by way of comparing and contrasting, and to, as well, examine the implications they have on our understanding of autonomy of states, and its essence in view of recent realities. To be succinct, this work aims at comparing and contrasting intervention and state-building, and their implications on the autonomy of states.

Theoretical framework of study – The collective responsibility principle

Adopting a description of international

relations by Stephanie Collins as "a dense web of interacting and overlapping collectives – from states, to intergovernmental organisations, to multinational corporations, to international nongovernmental organisations, to civil society movements…,"[5] the conceptual framework for this essay shall be the collective responsibility principle. This principle envisaged the international system as a global community, apparently with common concerns to be jointly nurtured and protected by mutual and distributive assignments, otherwise referred as shared responsibility. Hence, from Hannes Peltonen, we gather that the idea of collective responsibility holds internationality more as an intimate system of a community of peoples at the global level in disregard of the existing autonomous state components and other entities interacting internationally or transnationally as a society of actors. This is further fostered by the fact that certain human rights are universal to all peoples, irrespective of their state groupings, hence, there is the general realisation that certain attributes, for instance, the right to live concerns them all, and that they have the collective responsibility as moral agents to protect their common concerns. This, for instance, is seen in the need to jointly rise to confront or deter atrocious occurrences, such as the holocaust, genocides, horrors of the world wars, and such other crimes against humanity, which threaten their common concerns.

The concept of collective responsibility contextually refers to both the causal responsibility of moral agents for harm in the world and their ascriptive blameworthiness for having caused such harm. Hence, it is almost always a notion of moral, rather than purely causal responsibility. But it does not associate either causal responsibility or blameworthiness with discrete individuals or locate the source of moral responsibility in the free will of individual moral agents. Instead, it associates both causal responsibility and blameworthiness with groups and locates the source of moral responsibility in the collective actions taken by these groups understood as collectives.[7] However, Alberto Giubilini and Neil Levy pertinently asked if there is such a thing as collective responsibility. They further queried with specific scenarios:

> Can a corporation, a state, a mob, a social movement, a random collection of individuals be collectively morally responsible for things like an environmental disaster, a bad policy, an act of violence, a form of discrimination, or the failure to realize herd immunity or to help people in need? Or is it only individual members of these collectives who are morally responsible for such states of affairs?[8]

Their probe is premised on the wide and eclectic debates surrounding the existence and sanctity of collective responsibility as a principle. The major debates are in respect of the rightness or otherwise, of apportioning or assigning responsibility to the collectives on the grounds of causality and morality. Many thinkers have faulted the properness ascribing both causal responsibility and blameworthiness to groups in the collective actions taken by these groups, otherwise referred as collectives. For instance, Ronald Tinnevelt inquired if it is proper or sensible to assign or attribute responsibility to national peoples for the injustices and losses they impose on others?[9] The problem is that the notion of collective responsibility deems groups to be moral agents, as distinct from their individual members, whereas, the philosophical individualists held that by associating moral agency with groups, as distinct from their individual members, collective responsibility violates principles of both individual responsibility and fairness.[10] However, Pettit, a major proponent of the collective responsibility principle, having established a case for corporate responsibility, also argued for the ascription of group-level responsibility to national peoples, because, nations, as "looser collections of individuals… can and should be held responsible in a similar way" as incorporated groups. Tinnevelt had reasoned Pettit's ascription of group-level responsibility to nations, based on the developmental rationale

aimed at inducing in them just as we treat our children "the sort of self-awareness and self-regulation" that responsibility requires we treat them "as if they were fit to be held responsible," in other words, The same line of reasoning applies to national peoples, hence, nations ought to be held responsible "as a way to responsibilise them."[12]

As this work never intend to be bogged down by, or engage the many debates on causality and the location and rightness of moral responsibility, a further justification, sufficient for this essay's use of the theory, even beyond Philip Pettit's indictment of nations for causal and moral responsibilities, is based on the further argument by Collins. Stephanie Collins methodically posited that such a group of nations, composed of humans that are united under a group-level decision-making processes, and which, as a collective moral agency has implications for international politics. This specifically is in respect of some groups in international politics, (such as intergovernmental organisations like the United Nations, African Union and the European Union) whose decision-making processes involve informal diplomatic wrangling, power-play, self-interest on the part of members, and case-by-case bargaining among members.[13] Further in Collins' methodology, any group with its own decision-making procedure is an agent that can make decisions, have goals, and perform tasks distinctly from its members. Thus, for Collins:

> Once a relevant IGO is in place, there is an over-arching procedure that can organise states towards such collectively-attainable outcomes—and so, can bear prospective responsibility for doing so (and retrospective responsibility for not doing so). Indeed, many IGOs positively endorse this conception of themselves as responsibility-bearing collective agents—most prominently, the UN and the EU.

It is on this submission that the collective responsibility principle is adopted to guide this essay.

Conceptualising autonomy, sovereignty, state-building and intervention.

Autonomy is a concept that has gained traction in recent political theorisation, but which is also used in multivariate spectrum such as biological and other cognitive sciences, and also in philosophical and applied ethics. John Collier likened autonomous systems with autopoietic systems (deriving from "self-producing"), as that which both produce their own governance, and use that governance to maintain themselves.[14] Thus, in Collier's claim, a system is autonomous if it uses its own information to modify itself and its environment to enhance its survival, responding to both environmental and internal stimuli to modify its basic functions to increase its viability."[15] Collier's claim about autonomy succinctly approximates the principle of state's sovereignty, which principally means the self-governing authority of the state, without any external interference.

But ideas from Agich,[16] Christman[17] and Dworkin[18] conceived autonomy in such a perspective that is most similar in definition to political sovereignty, having originated from the Greeks City-states as *autos* (self) and *nomos* (rule, governance, or law), which by essence means self-rule or self-governance. The term later became widely referred to mean self-determination, self-rule, freedom of will, dignity, integrity, individuality, independence and self-knowledge. Autonomy is also identified with the qualities of self-assertion, critical reflection, responsibility and self-affirmation, the absence of external causation, and knowledge of one's own interest; it is also thought of in connection with actions, beliefs, principles, reasons for acting, and rules.

However, the multi-spectral usage of autonomy as a concept has made it to also become vague in definition, just also as some scholars have opted to preclude it from being broadly used to refer to full state's

sovereignty. Scholars of this persuasion preferred to limit its usage as mere arrangements or instrument for self-determination granted to a subset of the state, which enables such subgroup in question "to regulate independently the affairs central to the concerns of its members."[19] However, for this study, the concepts of autonomy and sovereignty shall be used interchangeably, and as representing the same phenomenon.

State-building, as a topic and concept, just also as that of intervention, had recently gained political relevance within the international community and the academia, yet its importance has continued to soar due to the emergent exigencies of systemic dynamics. This is also because, in international relations, states remained the primary and most decisive actors exercising great influence on the relationships between nations, and on world affairs. So the attention had been towards a better understanding of the nature and relevance of states, what they ought to be, and how they ought to perform, in order to better position them for the Weberian optima of human development. The attention on states is very significant, given the worrisome suggestion by the Department for International Development (DFID)[20] that well over 40 states are either fragile or riddled in conflict since the millennium, and are disincentive for human comfort, growth and development. Attentions on states are also imperative, due to Joel Migdal's assertion that states have become the dominant model for organising societies within defined territories.[21] So, the academic enterprise is to ascertain the nature of a healthy state from the sickly/dysfunctional one, and how the latter can be better helped. Helping the dysfunctional states to become positive contributing actor in the international system is the primary constitution of state-building as a concept.

Simply defined, state-building is the process through which states enhance their ability to function in such a way that it lead to effective economic management with political and economic inclusion.[22] However, the interesting twist or reality here, according to Alan Whaites is that state-building takes place in all states. Regardless about whether it is rich or poor, resilient or fragile, all states seek to make their structures better at delivering on the goals of government.[23] He concludes that state-building is essentially a national process, primarily shaped by local dynamics, and being a product of state-society relations, but which may be externally influenced through trade, the media and aid. However, Zoe Scott contends that it is not possible to consistently identify one coherent perspective on state-building due to its multidisciplinary nature and discourses, because it often involves extremely complex situations.[24] Hence, state-building draws interests and discourses from social sciences, political studies, international relations, anthropology, economics, and international development and security studies, among others.[25] For Scott, "in general, most people use 'state-building' to refer to interventionist strategies to restore and rebuild the institutions and apparatus of state. Between Whaites and Scott, the perspective to state-building is different. While one saw state-building as being the need of every kind of state, which also downplayed external interference as playing a critical role than the internal dynamics in the process, the other conceptualised it as an extremely interventionist adventure to help a dire state.

From the literatures, however, it is not unlikely that Alan Whaites generalised state-building as being the need of every state, having conflated it with the other related idea of nation-building, which, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) refers to "actions undertaken, usually by national actors, to forge a sense of common nationhood, usually in order to overcome ethnic, sectarian or communal differences; (and) usually to counter alternate sources of identity and loyalty…"[26] But then, state-building presupposes that of nation-building, meaning a nation first comes into being, before transforming into statehood. Hence also, the coming into existence of a nation-state involves a conscious internal activity and process, which though Alan Whaites had

alternated for state-building. But Whaites stands aloof from some other contending arguments that the two concepts stood in mutual opposition.[27] Apart from substituting nation-building for state-building, in complimentary terms, it had also been often erroneously referred to mean democratization, modernization, political development, post-conflict reconstruction, and peace building, whereas, the concepts – nation-building and state-building are not exactly the same.

But like state-building, nation-building may also be externally influenced or kick-started, as it were with most African states, which evolved from colonial independence. However and notwithstanding that many had often used the terms interchangeably, the mainstream idea in the literatures affirms that state-building is usually externally driven, unlike the other, and its idea is usually about foreign attempt at fixing fragile states, or states in distress. Hence also, most current literature on international state-building is concerned with external attempt to reconstruct states and societies.[28] For instance, state-building is when the international community, particularly for instance, when the United states endeavoured to restore the failed Somalia in the 1990s, and more recently, the collapse of Moammar Gaddafi's authoritarian hold on Libya, which plunged the state into complete chaos, contested among various warlords. The liberal entailments of state-building may include the institution of such policy frameworks and activities that restore law and order, rule of law, good governance and economic development and the respect for human rights.[29]

However, state-building, from the external, has been severally criticised as being 'neo-imperialistic' or 'neo-colonialist' in nature. A major criticism by Mallaby[30] and Etzioni[31] holds that externally sourced state-building suffers altruistic deficits because, in often the cases, its activities are aimed at the ultimate benefit of the intervening foreign actors, instead of it being geared towards the benefits of the poor locals on ground. It also carries the overtones of meeting the needs of the external actors in the international community, rather than the needs of the poor communities on ground. The other similar criticism, especially when undertaken by western powers, is that such state-building often aims at actually transferring or imposing Western values, institutions, ideals and norms on the recipient peoples, spurring the accusations of neo-imperialism,[32] and such phenomena that engendered Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilisation' by which terror groups like the Al Qaeda found justification for their operations. It is thus the warning that that "the West should not impose its models and norms on the rest of the world, and that state-building must be understood as an endogenously driven process that is both political and context-specific".[33]

While it might be said that state-building assistance can be a crucial factor to help beneficiary states to grow, scholars like Chesterman et al, argued that state-building is an exercise in futility because "states cannot be made to work from the outside."[34] But this position might be untenable because the institutionalised financial aid like the Marshall Plan and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is capable of propping beneficiary states for growth and development. The Marshall Plan, in particular, was most helpful in helping to rebuild Western European states after their Second World War devastations. Perhaps, and aside the communist's and other Cold War encumbrances, it was the singular factor for explaining the developmental gap between western and Eastern Europe in the post WWII period. While most western European state' beneficiaries of the Plan recouped from their massive destruction to prosperity, most eastern European states that never partook of the Funds barely survived. However, Chesterman et al did not preclude external interventions in troubled states, particularly on humanitarian grounds. Only that such international action should be conceived as "facilitating local processes, providing resources and creating the space for

local actors to start a conversation that will define and consolidate their polity by mediating their vision of a good life into responsive, robust, and resilient institutions."[35] This brings to fore the all-important discourse of state's resilience. Delf Rothe contends that the idea of resilience, is the ability of social, economic or ecological systems to autonomously recover after shocks, and to adapt to changing environmental conditions,[36] more so that change and adaptation, according to Chandler, ought to come from within.[37] Yet also, following the controversies and accusations of neo-colonial/neo-imperialism associated with the enterprise, others have now precluded state-building as mainly endeavours to be undertaken within the context of 'war on terror', but to be carried out by 'a body with broad internationalism and local legitimacy'. The UN is such a body in the minds of Samuels and Esiedel.[38]

With respect to Intervention**,** the question is pertinent as asked by Gareth Evans: What should be the response of the international community when faced by catastrophic human rights violations within states, (especially) where the state in question claims immunity from intervention (external interference) based on longstanding principles of national sovereignty?[39] It has been earlier suggested that when horrific crises occur within states, human morality and altruism behove that the international society folds not its hands any longer. Like the previously mentioned genocidal cases in Rwanda and Bosnia, the former crisis in Darfur (Sudan) readily comes to mind as a humanitarian tragedy and a guilt in the conscience of the world. As reported by Africa Report[40] in the space of a few years, over two hundred thousand people were ethnically cleansed, and over two million displaced with further thousands succumbing to war-related plagues and malnutrition and a generally worsened life conditions.[41] In Bosnia Herzegovina, the Srebrenica massacre of 1995 has been acknowledged as Europe's first genocide since World War II. It is thus expected that insecurity, particularly of lives and property will fuel international interventionism.[42]

Moreover, experiences from the interconnectedness of states in the international community have shown that a single state in calamity can constitute a regional calamity, if not global insecurity. At the takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban in 1996, the unconventional political and administrative regime adopted by the group, not only shut the doors of the country to the international community, but made it to also connive with Al-Qaeda terrorist group, who eventually used the self-imposed isolation of Afghanistan to hatch the horrendous plan for the September 11 attacks. The ensuing shock to the international economy was global in scale, just also as the eventual irreparable human and material losses. It eventually led to the forceful intervention by the United States in Afghanistan, supported by Britain, Canada, Australia, France and Germany. While the success or otherwise of the intervention is not up for discussion now, it is rather the fact that it yielded positive outcomes for international peace and security. It significantly led to the destruction of the locus of the globally dreaded terror organisation; the arrest of many of its crucial leaders and brains; and the eventual elimination of its kingpin, Osama bin Laden. After September 11, the U.S. government exerted great effort to track down Al-Qaeda agents and sympathizers throughout the world, and made combating terrorism the focus of its foreign policy. Apart that intervention made the world safer, it also emancipated the hitherto repressed citizens of the country, most especially the women, who had almost been totally excluded from social life, including in education and employment.

By intervention is meant the disregard of state's autonomy, because, by autonomy and its related other – sovereignty is meant that states are insulated from any external interference. But Gareth Evans' question is germane, making intervention a veritable instrument to halt horrendous developments in state. However, intervention might impugn on the right of such state to self-governing and independence. Intervention is against the longstanding principle of national sovereignty, for a forceful interference in a state by external bodies, which could either be a state with the preponderance power, a regional intervention force, or forces from a

coalition of the willing countries, in order to arrest ugly trends, and to stabilise the disturbed state. Interventions can usually be hinged on humanitarian motives, or the effort to address certain injustice, or a combination of both. But it is also undertaken as measures to achieve strategic ends, for instance, in the interest of peace, security, anti-terrorism, energy, resource or economic strategies. International intervention may also be undertaken to deter the aggression of one state against another, as it were the case when the United States led the UN forces to roll back the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait in 1991.

The road to this new interventionism was gradual, though, not to assume that international interventionism was only a recent post-Cold War development as Bass, in his Origins of Humanitarian Intervention, recalled the efforts in the 19th Century aimed at stopping atrocities in Greece, Bulgaria, Syria, and Armenia.[43] At the inception of the United Nations in 1945, external interference (intervention) was expressly forbidden, although the UN Charter provided for its Security Council to ensure international peace and security. However, the UN Charter, in Article 2(7) significantly upheld the principle of non-interference. From Evans, 'nothing contained in the (1945) Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.'[44] But with the Genocide Convention of 1948, the UN had realised the need to amend its Charter to excuse exceptions to the principle of non-interference especially as genocidal acts mounted among new member states that were acceding to the UN treaty. The Cold War division that soon followed the establishment of the UN however rendered the organisation ineffective at conducting such humanitarian interventions. By the end of the Cold War when division had given way to international cooperation, the series of committees, and activities and debates of the UN, and the numerous concerns of many stakeholders in the international community had made obvious the need to tinker with the concept of sovereignty, to give room for humanitarian intervention. A non-liberal argument from Finkenbusch was that "behind the benign rhetoric of local ownership and empowerment lies the continued predominance of liberal-universal episteme."[45] These series of activities and debates had led to the idea of interventions based on the *Responsibility to Protect* (R2P), and from heretofore, interventions became deemed legitimate and needful.

Mohammed Ayoob described it as new interventionism because, far from being as previously haphazard with accusations of the pursuit of concealed selfish interests, the various debaters, interested stakeholders and the establishing principles also streamlined and moderated its conduct, both between the interfering and the interfered states. For the latter, the eternalness of sovereignty was over with, it was no longer a sacrosanct internal attribute. The newly conceived R2P approach to sovereignty was that the state now has certain responsibilities to its citizens, the international community and its guiding institutions.[46] When the government can no longer guarantee these responsibilities, particularly to protect its citizens, the international community is morally bound to waive such state's sovereignty for intervention. To the former, the new interventionism is also deemed to be humanitarian and universal, and not political and strategic. It is also to be undertaken by the international community not by states or a coalition of them, like the type of international coalition that the United States built against Saddam Hussein and Iraq after the latter's annexation of Kuwait in January 16, 1991. The participating states are deemed, in Rousseaunian sense, as mere agents of the international community,[47] and not any longer as interested parties. The measures are hoped to ameliorate the problems of legitimacy and criticisms confronting interventionism.[48];

State-building and intervention: the essence, justifications, relations and processes

From the conceptual analysis, it is doubtless that both acts constitute external interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. The concern is not necessarily about the legality or otherwise of the acts and their other controversies, but rather on the fact that a breach of the state's autonomy had occurred. But then also, given the various experiences

and concerns of the international community, both acts have now been sanctioned and fairly streamlined for justificatory use. While both concepts may be similar in ends, they are rather different in processes, purposes, operational costs, and in modus operandi. As earlier espoused by Alan Whaites, state-building takes place in all states, whether rich or poor, resilient or fragile, since all countries seek to consolidate on their structures for better delivery on the goals of state and government.

State-building is relatively cheap in operational process and costs, and in modus operandi, and, it is the only peaceful means of intervening in sovereign states. The means of state-building ranges from, and are not precluded to monetary donations, to offers of cheap loans for recovery or development, donations of material/scientific resources or facilities (for instance to alleviate poverty, improve health and medical services), foreign direct investment, and offer of technical personnel, expertise and services, including specialised training for capacity building. A good example was Nigeria's endeavour in the 1980s and early 1990s, during the General Badamosi Babangida Administration, to institute the Technical Aids Corps Scheme (TACS) through which Nigeria sent its finest graduates and professionals in the technical areas that were grossly lacking in many African states at the time. The scheme, all at Nigeria's expense and sponsorship, allowed the beneficiary countries to be serviced by Nigerian lawyers, medical doctors, pharmacists, and engineers in diverse fields.

Multinational state-building is often the preferable approach by the international community to intervene in states, with the hope of boosting the viability of such states, this way, the efforts of any ambitious state at subverting the receiving state as stooge may be futile. Apart that it is describable as a commonwealth approach aimed at improving or strengthening the interstate system by building all member states to be healthy and mutually viable actors, it is also a veritable means of preventing fragile states from weakening or failing outright. The world is increasingly being confronted today by the failed states' syndrome, which has constituted 'international public bads' in the idea of Fearon & Laitin.[49] Hence, state-building, alongside capacity-building is crucial at arresting ugly developments in states before they escalate and endanger the international system. However, state-building is usually subtle in approach and is consensually welcomed by states concerned.

On the other hand, foreign intervention, unlike external efforts for state-building, usually constitute forceful acts of interference. A critical factor for intervention is that, it is usually undertaken when the internal affairs of the concerned had degenerated to the extent that lives of citizens and regional peace are threatened. The recent rise in international terrorism is a factor that necessitated interventionism, hence, the current war on terror is a form of international intervention. Failed states, like Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Libya, Syria and others constitute international public bads that may affect their citizens and region, and the international community precariously. Such states are usually in chaos and can no longer reproduce their Weberian essence and state conception as a "human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."[50] The ensuing disorder creates safe-havens for terrorists and other criminal elements to hide in, and plan their nefarious activities. It must be borne in mind that failed states or states in distress are no longer capable of effectively securing their territories and borders, and hence, they become easily violated by roving criminal elements, who turn them in their *untouchable* entities into hide-outs, from where they terrorise and destabilise other states, especially in the region. The Sahel province of West Africa is prototypical of this scenario, where transnational bandits or terror groups like nomadic cattle herders[51] and rustlers, and the Islamic jihadist groups as Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, Islamic state in West Africa Province (ISWAP), and ISIS. They are currently rampaging freely, kidnapping, killing, and displacing the natives from Mauritania, Mali, Cote D'ivoire, Niger

to Nigeria,

The Osama bin Laden Al-Qaeda group hid away in the failed Afghanistan to hatch September 11 attacks. The Islamic state in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) hid in the failing Iraq and Syria to perpetrate their terror internationally. The sizable African Sahel, and the states, therein, are currently in turmoil because of the failed Libya and other fragile states in the region.[52] The inability of those states to keep law and order, and to legitimately monopolise the use of physical force, have created opportunities for terror and criminal groups to freely operate across multiple borders, and had wreaked colossal humanitarian disasters in the process. For the African Sahel to regain its peace, there is thus, a dire need for international interventions.

But while state-building may involve preventative diplomacy and the injection of foreign aid to prop distressed states, intervention is rather usually a military approach which may be consensual or not. It is undertaken as a conflict management measure to establish order by peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian assistance. Intervention can also be by international sanctions where necessary.

Autonomy and the implications for state-building and intervention

State-building and intervention from the external are different in nature, intent, strategy and modus operandi, however, they both constitute a transgressive meddling in the autonomy of states, though in varying degrees. While state-building is a subtle intrusion in the targeted states, though with the admirable intention of helping to build a strong, virile and stable states, intervention is often a boldfaced activity, conducted in forceful interference or disregard for state's autonomy in states that have either failed or are engrossed in turmoil. Intervention is inevitable, most especially, when there are evidence of humanitarian disasters and war crimes being committed. But while as espoused above, state-building is a desire of every rich or poor state, many states are often ready to let down on their claims to autonomy because of the attendant benefits of the subtly meddlesome assistance. Foreign-sourced state-building do not usually and wholly curtail the integrity and capacity of states' governments, in fact, the host government often have the privilege of overseeing state-building programmes or the deployment of aid items.

However, a major implication is that the externally sponsored state-building programmes may actually be designed and undertaken to deliberately undermine other states. Thus, this would undercut the capacities of targeted states and governments, vis-a-vis the propping of their autonomy. Clandestine state-building programmes may have been intended to penetrate and violate states, toward taking undue advantage of them, especially in the areas of economy, military and natural resources. The integrity of the host country is liable to compromise as desperate and imperialist donor countries might use that pretext to surreptitiously penetrate targeted countries. The state-building programmes may have been designed to: gaining undue access into the commanding heights of the economies of targeted states, gaining the knowledge of the secrets of their national success in specific sectors (for after all, knowledge is power, which could be used to enhance, influence, elicit or change decisions across board). Foreign-sponsored state-building programmes may also be used to raise *fifth columnist* groups, or, to propagandistically indoctrinate and instigate state's citizens against their government in the interest of the sponsor(s).

It is factual that states that are wont to state-building assistance are vulnerable and predisposed to covert penetration. Examples abound about how recipient states became infiltrated or critically subverted to all intents and purposes.[53] Africa, of all the continents other than Europe, had been worsted and endlessly subjugated on the pretext of state-building by foreign countries and agents.[54] For instance, at their independence in the 1960s, and as parts of efforts to help develop

the new states, some of the Great powers, especially France established scientific research stations and capacity-training schools in some former colonies in Africa. In the end, many of these turned out in reality to be either military bases in disguise or espionage facilities to spy on the new states who were mostly naïve about the deception and intrigues of international politics. Most of such establishment became the means of gaining foothold and control in the post-colonial countries for neocolonial purposes and activities. The state-building assets that the western powers endowed African states with, were mostly not from the altruistic motive for development assistance, but rather as means to an end, and the end was either to keep gaining the control of such African state, or, for the ultimate benefit of the European state.

The British laid rail track from Lagos (by the sea) all the way to Kano (far in the hinterland), not to develop the transportation system in Nigeria in the genuine sense but to help the British industries and merchants to drain the resource-rich countries of its natural resources.[55] When Guinea opted for political independence and refused to accept its neocolonial overtures in a 1958 referendum,[56] France stripped the fledgling state of all pre-independence assets that it had previously been endowed with. It is learned that France dismantled the entire colonial state in two months, removing or destroying everything they could, including light bulbs; scrapped plans for a new sewer system, and telephone wires; and even "burned medicines rather than leave them for the Guineans."[57] At their political independence, the European Economic Community established the Africa-Caribbean Pact (ACP) with the guaranteed hope of buying their primary produce, however, the Pact was not genuinely intended as means of economic well-being and prosperity for building the new states, but to perpetuate them mainly as primary producers confined to very low earnings, and who will eventually and inevitably depend[58] on importation of finished goods from the West.

The other implication of the externally-sourced state-building is that state-beneficiaries of aid programmes may also become the foreign policy pawns of powerful donors. Put differently, state-building programmes often induces slave-holding conditionality between the sponsoring states and the receiver states, such that the latter's capacity for desired foreign policy choices are effectively curtailed and thereby subverted as overseas subsidiaries, acting in the interest of such imperial powers. The possibility of this national subjugation supports Mallaby[59] and Etzioni[60] separate submissions that externally sourced state-building suffers altruistic deficits.

However, there is hardly any state or government, whether rich or poor, that is desirous of external intervention because intervention operates in utter disregard for the government of the target state, and it is often undertaken under the pretext or believe that such government had lost its essence. Also, like the state-building project that can be deceptive, external intervention in states can be deceptive and dangerous. When, following the September 11 attacks by Al-Qaeda, the American president George Bush Jnr. led the coalition of the willing states to intervene in Iraq on the pretext that Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, was a state-promoter of international terrorism and seeking as well to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the consequences were very grave. President Saddam Hussein was not only hounded out of power and killed, Iraq became plunged into complete disaster and failure, leading to terror and anarchy, the vacuum eventually led to the rise of the Islamic state in the Levant, a brutal terror group that destabilised the entire region and beyond, and killing thousands of innocent civilians. Many had blamed the United states, not only for acting aggressively against Iraq, but for acting as an imposter in the image of a world police, an antithetical position to the autonomous states' system, and for which the larger part of the world are anathematising the United states as an arrogant state. This again reinstates the clamour that state-building should mainly endeavours to be undertaken, not just within the context of war on confirmed terror, but also to be carried out by a body with

broad internationalism and popular legitimacy, such as the United Nations. In the very end, investigations absolved Saddam Hussein from any trace to Al-Qaeda or the possession of WMD. The unfortunate intervention in Iraq, however, does not negate the essence for external intervention in states with verifiable and genuine need, nevertheless, the decision to undertake such must be determined by a multiplicity of factors and group, and must also be undertaken, not as a coalition of any interest, but as an international delegate of the United Nations.

In closing, it is needful to assert that there is hardly any state that has not really experienced one interference or the other. The interference may not have been forceful or meddlesome as in intervention, or, in state-building in the real sense, but the variously existing international laws and regimes and institutions, including the Breton woods' have severally affected the autonomous operations of sovereign states. Also as powerful states conform to international laws, regimes and conventions, they are invariably restricted to pave way for state-building in weaker states that had less capacity to favourably compete in the international community.

In conclusion also, it must be re-emphasised as earlier declared, that this work interchangeably uses the terms – autonomy and sovereignty as referring to the authority of states for independent operation and self-rule, without any undue interference from any external organisation, be it other states, supranational organisations or international institutions. However, state's autonomy or sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct since the international community had redefined it as based on systemic exigencies. This redefinition has modified the principle of autonomy of states as sovereignty now behoves government the responsibility to protect the people, and respect their inalienable human rights, anything contrary has compromised the government's right of autonomy, and the international community is ethically bound under the UN's *Responsibility to Protect* (R2P) Act to intervene. This, pronto, is collective responsibility.

This trend has been effected by the African Union (AU), which previously as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) had rigidly adhered to the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states, by which many African states had descended into horrendous civil wars with mammoth humanitarian disasters. Such were the 1994 Rwandan genocide that decimated about a million Tutsi minority in the space of three months. The other was the 2003 ethnic cleansing in the Darfur region of Sudan. But with the AU, though its operating Charter still respected the non-interference clause in respect of the autonomy of state, but not any longer with the previous rigidity. The AU Constitutive Act now reserves for "the right of the Union to intervene in a Member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity."

Endnotes and References

1 It needs stating that both intervention and state-building are similar, and yet, dissimilar. They are similar, being efforts from the external, at salvaging a distressed state, but by intruding into the autonomy of sovereign states. They are however, dissimilar by methods and process.

2 Autonomy had been the inalienable right of modern states to self-determining and self-governing. Ever since the evolution of the modern international system, states had been infused with powers of autonomy and sovereignty partly as strategies to curtail incessant interstate conflicts, especially against the reckless imperial and aggressive ambitions of some states. Looking back in history, the strategy of the principle of autonomy was to arrest incessant interstate frictions triggered often by the unbridled imperial aggressions of the ambitious princes, and which also had plagued the pre-Congress of Vienna European Principalities into internecine conflicts. Autonomous states for national (self-determinist) groups also gained acceptability after the killing of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and wife, by Gavrilo Princip on 28 June 1914. Consequently, all modern

states, with the exception of the dependencies and the protectorates all operated as sovereign autonomies. Ever since then also, and especially after 1945 (the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations on 24 October 1945), the international system had significantly tamed interstate aggression and conflict, which in turn also fostered greater systemic peace, security and cooperation, and enabled humanity to experience mammoth growth, multifaceted development and constructive interconnectedness.

3 Of course, these principles, protocols and conventions had in themselves subtly encroached into the autonomy of states. They however are not as severe as actual external intervention.

4 The interconnectedness of the globe, and its intricate web of transportation/ communication systems have made it possible to reside in one extreme of the earth and hatch a plot against another entity at the other extreme. Despite the huge gap in distance, the Arabian men of Al Qaeda hid in Afghanistan to remarkably plot against the United States on September 11.

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35 Chesterman, et al ,

36 Delf Rothe, 'Climate Change and Security: From Paradigmatic Resilience To Resilience Multiple,' in *The Routledge Handbook Of International Resilience*, eds. 37 David Chandler and Jon Coaffee (London: Routledge, 2017), 171-184.

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41 International Crisis Group

42 Of course, by the end of Twentieth Century, and consequent upon the problem of growth, the world began to experience new menacing evils that endangered humanity unprecedentedly. Many states had failed, or, are failing, while some had been violently contested. Quite a number of them had also been entangled in crimes against humanity. Yet again, bold terrorism and syndicated criminality had preyed on the sacrosanctity of autonomy to latch on systemic interconnectedness for further perpetration of humanitarian horrors. Consequently, two new concepts or strategies crept into the international political system – intervention and state-building, both which are external efforts aimed at redeeming distressed states from becoming 'international public bads'. The ultimate is to regain/manage systemic peace and security, but which, in operationalism, had scathing implications for state's autonomy. They are crucial, however, if humanity and internationalism must sustain. The essence of state's autonomy must be reappraised to pave way for intervention and state-building.

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48 Many had criticised the United States for acting to form the international coalition against Iraq, based on its strategic reliance on the cheap Middle Eastern oil supplies, especially from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which would had been the next Iraqi target after Kuwait. The Iraqi annexation, if successful, would have been a grievous threat to Americans energy security.

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52 O. J. Odeyemi, 'Transnational Insurgency and Terrorism in Africa: Issues and Tasks for Regional Integration,' *Journal of Arts and Contemporary Society*, 8 (1), (2016), 2.

53 North Korea is known to be extremely secretive, outrightly communist and committably irreligious, yet, the United States was said to have militarily infiltrated North Korea using as means, an American Christian Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO), the Humanitarian International Services Group (HISG), initiated by Kay Hiramine. The NGO was renowned for shipping humanitarian aid around the world, including North Korea, where the government accepted it to help its destitute population endure harsh winters. As the NGO successfully, by test run, smuggled bibles hidden beneath the donated winter clothing and ski jackets, the Pentagon thought it safe to, and did smuggle military sensors and equipment into the country by that same means, which lasted for years. The Hiramine mission targeted the operational preparation of the environment for clandestine intelligence gathering and prepositioning equipment inside the country for future conflicts. See: Matthew Cole, The Pentagon's Missionary Spies: U.S. Military Used Christian NGO as Front for North Korea Espionage. The Intercept, 2015.

54 For Africa, the history of foreign-sourced state-building began with foreign subjugation because it had culminated in its eventual European partitioning and colonisation. It began with the Belgian King Leopold II, his humanitarian efforts, so-called, to help African peoples, especially the Congolese. King Leopold had disguised as a concerned philanthropy eager to bring the benefits of commerce, civilisation, research and development to African natives. He also advocated the need to enforce the abolition of slavery in Africa. Toward these ends he established the International Association for the Exploration and Civilisation of Central Africa in 1876. He thereupon convened an international conference of explorers and geographers in Brussels. In the very end, his ambition, to which he secretly incorporated Henry Morton Stanley, the British explorer, was to help him secure a choice, vast resource-rich part of Africa to build his personal wealth, outside the reach of the Belgian people's government, which had grossly limited him as a constitutional monarchy. However, other European powers and statesmen got up to his shenanigan ambition/covetousness, leading to the partitioning of Africa into European colonial states. King Leopold II will be infamously remembered in Congolese history as a draconic colonialist who enriched himself through massive exploitation of both the natives and their resources. Thus, what began as state-building project ended in a century of colonial subjugation/exploitation, and despite that Africa had regained political independence, western neo-colonial hold has continued to hold the continent down from development.

55 It eventually took Nigeria an upward of almost five decades, after political independence, to begin a proper establishment of the rail transport system with Chinese assistance, expertise and financial loans.

56 All French citizens and colonial subjects had in 1958 been subjected to a referendum to approve a Constitution offered by the Government of the Republic of France, directing that all French colonies be ushered into independence as French subjects. Every colony voted yes with the exception of Guinea, which opted to be completely free of French authority and influence. It was a decision that came with serious penalties in the hands of France and aimed to intimidate their other colonies about the price to pay, should they want to tow the Guinean heels.

57 Andrew Tietz, 'Ce Qui Reste: Legacies of Decolonization in Guinea and Gabon'. *Honors Projects International Studies, Illinois Wesleyan University*, Spring 2022, Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.

iwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=intstu_honproj

58 This explained why much of Africa is plagued with dependent development. They ranged from dependent economies to dependent agriculture, dependent exportation and importation, dependent financial systems, even to dependent industrialisation. This made genuine nation-building difficult for African states. Even the post-independence absorption of new states into imperially linked confederations like the Commonwealth of Nations and *La Francophonie,* were decoys for subtle, neocolonial exploitation and regrouping/disuniting them, which again disoriented the concerned states from enjoying true political independence.

59 Mallaby, 'The Reluctant Imperialist'

60 Etzioni, 'A Self-Restrained Approach'